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Abstract
The Internet has provided people with new ways of expressing not only their
individuality but also their collectivity i.e., their group affiliations. These group
identities are the shared sense of belonging to a group. Online contact with
others who share the same group identity can lead to cooperation and, even,
coordination of social action initiatives both online and oﬄine. Such social ac-
tions may be for the purposes of positive change, e.g., the Arab Spring in 2010,
or disruptive, e.g., the England Riots in 2011. Stylometry and authorship attri-
bution research has shown that it is possible to distinguish individuals based on
their online language. In contrast, this work proposes and evaluates a model to
analyse group identities online based on textual conversations amongst groups.
We argue that textual features make it possible to automatically distinguish be-
tween different group identities and detect whether group identities are salient
(i.e., most prominent) in the context of a particular conversation. We show that
the salience of group identities can be detected with 95% accuracy and group
identities can be distinguished from others with 84% accuracy. We also identify
the most relevant features that may enable mal-actors to manipulate the actions
of online groups. This has major implications for tools and techniques to drive
positive social actions online or safeguard society from disruptive initiatives. At
the same time, it poses privacy challenges given the potential ability to persuade
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or dissuade large groups online to move from rhetoric to action.
Keywords: Social Identities, Online Social Media, Natural Language
Processing
1. Introduction
Global and national events over recent years have shown that online social
media can be a force for good (e.g., Arab Spring in 2010) and harm (e.g., the
England Riots in 2011). In both of these examples, social media played a key
role in group formation and organisation, and in the coordination of the group’s5
subsequent collective actions (i.e., the move from rhetoric to action) (Halliday;
Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Such coordinated actions are possible because individ-
uals identify themselves with a particular social group or with an ideal (Taylor
et al., 1992). Online identity in such contexts is, therefore, not so much about
the categorisation of the self as a singular “I”. Instead it is the conception and10
expression of group affiliations as a more inclusive “we”.
This paper focuses on these online group identities. Oﬄine group identities
are usually referred to as social identities by social identity theory (Stryker
& Burke, 2000; Deaux, 1996; Tajfel, 2010), a social psychological theory that
sets out to explain group processes, intergroup relationships and the social self.15
Social identity is the individual’s explicit or implicit expression of belonging
to certain social group, together with some emotional and value significance to
him/her of the group membership (Tajfel, 2010). Thus, a person has not one
“personal self” but rather multiple social identities that are culturally contingent
and contextual (Hankin, 2013). The salient identity is the identity that comes20
into play and is invoked in a specific situation or context (Stryker & Burke,
2000). Thus, a social identity is salient when it is invoked across a group of
persons who perceive themselves as members of a social group. Which identity
becomes salient in a given situation depends on factors such as the level of
commitment of a person to a particular identity. One component of commitment25
is the number of others with whom one is connected by possessing a particular
2
identity. Thus, when a person shares a certain identity with a greater number of
people, his/her commitment to that identity tends to be higher and this identity
is likely to be more salient (Stryker, 1980).
Given the importance of online social media in orchestrating and coordinat-30
ing large-scale group mobilisations —from democracy and protest movements
to hacktivist groups through to riots and extreme right wing marches— group
identities are of key interest to a variety of stakeholders. They can be: mobilised
as a resource for positive social change; studied to understand and counteract
organised online actions that may compromise the safety and security of citi-35
zens; and even potentially be harnessed to build resilience in individuals and
groups to limit the harmful effects of government or extremist efforts to disrupt
online group formation and subsequent mobilisation.
Of course, group identities are not the only variable that predicts behaviour,
but they can provide a guide to likely behaviours —as stated by social identity40
theory the higher the salience of a social identity (i.e., the identification with
a particular group), the greater the individual’s willingness to contribute to
the social action (Stryker & Burke, 2000; Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002). Social
identities have been shown to influence behaviour in many domains, including
politics (Jackson & Smith, 1999), protest movements (Reicher, 1996) and fan45
behaviour (Platow et al., 1999). Knowing how salient is group identity can lead
to predictions of how much the identity will influence the individuals’ beliefs,
emotions and actions. Since the activation of a social identity affects the way
people think as well as their feelings and behaviours, our hypothesis is that
such group identities also affect the way in which people communicate online.50
As such, our model characterises text-based online communications in terms of
a set of textual features such as their language, their style and their interaction
patterns (i.e., the way in which users interact). We then study the features that
can best distinguish between different group identities online as well as those
features that can indicate the salience, or lack thereof, group identities. We55
address research questions categorised as follows:
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1. Detecting salience of group identities:
(a) Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is it possible
to use textual features to automatically detect the presence of salient
group identities?60
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to detect identity salience across
different group identities and on different online social media?
(c) Which features are most suitable for detecting identity salience?
2. Distinguishing group identities:
(a) Is it possible to distinguish between different group identities on the65
basis of textual features automatically extracted from conversations?
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to distinguish group identities
over time and on different online social media?
(c) Which features enable a specific group identity to be accurately pre-
dicted?70
Our evaluation shows that, by using a range of structural, grammatical,
semantic, categorical and stylistic features, our model can detect the salience
of group identities with 95% accuracy and distinguish between group identities
with 84% accuracy. In general, our study reveals that there is much more
valuable information available on social media than just personal data. We75
identify features of online conversations that can reveal important dynamics
of online groups and, hence, potential drivers for mobilisation of such groups.
Notwithstanding the importance of protecting personal data on online social
media (Anthonysamy et al., 2013; Madejski et al., 2011), it is also important to
study and understand how group identities are formed and could be exploited80
for positive or negative ends. While the former has the potential to adversely
affect individuals, the latter has major implications for social action/inaction in
our modern digital society.
The novel contributions of this paper are fourfold:
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1. This is the first paper to propose a model to analyse online group identities85
based on social identity principles.
2. We use textual features to detect group identity and its salience. In con-
trast with other works that study the difficulties people encounter when
interacting with heterogeneous groups in an online social network, e.g.,
(DiMicco & Millen, 2007), or how online identities are constructed and90
shaped, e.g. (Zhao et al., 2008), all the features analysed in our model are
extracted fully automatically, i.e., no human intervention is required.
3. We demonstrate that group identities and their salience manifest them-
selves, with a high degree of accuracy, in text-based online communica-
tions through a range of structural, grammatical, semantic, categorical95
and stylistic features.
4. Our results open up key privacy challenges for the research community
at large with regards to the potential exploitation of group identities to
persuade or dissuade large groups online to move from rhetoric to action.
We have implemented an online tool that enables study of features un-100
derpinning online group identities in order to investigate these challenges.
We identify which features can put online groups at most risk of such ma-
nipulation by mal-actors so as to build resilience against such out-group
influences.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes related105
work. Section 3 presents our model for analysing group identities including the
features and the classifiers used in the analysis. Section 4 describes experiments
that validate of our model including the datasets used and the results obtained.
We discuss the implications of our model and experiments in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies directions for future work.110
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2. Related Work
Within the Artificial Intelligence field different computational models have
been proposed to represent social identities. One of the most cited models is the
ABIR (Agent-Based Identity Repertoire) model (Lustick, 2000), which seeks to
refine, elaborate, and test theories of identity and identity shifts. This model115
has been used in agent-based simulations to analyse the emergence (Rousseau
& Van Der Veen, 2005) and dynamics (Smaldino et al., 2012) of social identities
oﬄine. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first model for the automatic
analysis of group identities invoked on different online social media.
There are empirical proposals, as ours, that draw conclusions about identity120
from information extracted from online social media. DiMicco and Millen (DiM-
icco & Millen, 2007) describe a study about the way in which people present
themselves (i.e., the way in which people invoke their identities) on Facebook.
Specifically, the authors analysed Facebook profiles and interviewed employees
belonging to the same company with the aim of understanding how they man-125
aged their identity when interacting with different social groups (e.g., family,
friends from school, workmates, etc.) on Facebook. The main contribution
of their study was the identification of the difficulties that people encounter
when interacting with heterogeneous groups using the same online social net-
work; and the identification of the need for more sophisticated controls that130
help one to manage one’s identities online. Similarly, Zhao et al. (Zhao et al.,
2008) analysed Facebook profiles of students in a university to study how these
students presented themselves on Facebook. They focused on how the online
identities of these persons were “built” on Facebook. An interesting conclusion
of their study is that identities are usually claimed implicitly on Facebook (e.g.,135
people express that they belong to a group of friends by posting pictures with
these friends instead of writing it in their self-description). Our model, on the
other hand, explores group identities by focusing on automatically analysing the
interactions among users in which these identities are implicitly salient.
In recent study, Conover et al. (Conover et al., 2011) utilised clustering and140
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manual annotation of tweets to analyse the way in which people with different
political orientations (i.e., political identities) communicate on Twitter. Specif-
ically, they analysed the retweets and mentions (which include replies) among
users with different political orientations. Their study shows that tweets are
usually retweeted by users who have a homogeneous political orientation. In145
contrast, tweets are mentioned by users with a heterogeneous political orienta-
tion.
In all the proposals aforementioned, the information is manually analysed
and processed by humans. However, there are other proposals, like ours, in
which the information is automatically analysed and processed. Research in150
the field of stylometry and authorship attribution has focused on automatically
distinguishing between individuals online (Stamatatos, 2009; Narayanan et al.,
2012) as well as deception detection in online conversations (Afroz et al., 2012;
Rashid et al., 2013). In contrast, our approach focuses on analysis of group
identities instead of personal characteristics.155
Within the area of Social Networks a significant amount of work has been
done to detect user communities or densely connected subgroups of users in the
network (Girvan & Newman, 2002). In particular, several tools have been pro-
posed to detect communities automatically using unsupervised machine learning
algorithms (Fogue´s et al., 2014; Culotta et al., 2004; Matsuo et al., 2007). Al-160
though communities and group identities are not exactly the same concept (e.g.,
the fact that users belong to the same domain in a network does not entail that
they feel as members of the same social group), it might be argued that the
same techniques used for community detection can be used for group identity
analysis. However, proposals on community detection assume that the social165
network graph is known (i.e., the users and the relationships between users are
known), which makes possible the identification of tightly knit groups of users.
However, this assumption is too strong for group identity analysis because it is
not necessarily true that all users sharing a group identity are known. Similarly,
user relationships are likely to be unknown in this prediction problem. For ex-170
ample, in many online social media, like Facebook, the information about users’
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friends is private and cannot be exploited to detect group identities that are
expressed explicitly (i.e., by means of friendship relationships). This paper goes
beyond these approaches by using textual features to analysis group identities
that are implicitly salient in online conversations.175
Recent research on Natural Language Processing is directing its efforts to-
wards analysing short text messages exchanged online (Han & Baldwin, 2011).
In particular, several authors have proposed to combine machine learning and
natural language processing techniques to produce models that annotate short
text messages with tags identifying specific themes or content (Ramage et al.,180
2009). Note that these techniques can be used to detect conversations cor-
responding to specific topics, which could be used to perform group identity
analysis. However, the fact that a conversation is associated with a cohesive set
of topics does not necessary imply that the users share a common social identity.
For example, messages posted by users in a given review site (e.g., TripAdvisor1)185
may be associated with a reduced set of topics according to the nature of the
site (e.g., food, accommodation, attractions, etc.), but it is not necessarily true
that these users identify themselves as members of the same social group. Be-
sides that, these models only allow messages to be annotated with a predefined
set of tags and, as a consequence, they will fail to detect unforeseen topics that190
may be associated with emerging group identities. Our research also combines
machine learning with different analysis techniques such as NLP, stylometry and
interaction analysis to produce a model specifically aimed at predicting group
identities.
Verma et al. (Verma et al., 2011) propose and evaluate a classifier to detect195
those tweets that contribute to “situational awareness” in mass emergency. In
(Gupta & Kumaraguru, 2012) the authors have built a linear regression model
that takes as input text-content based features to predict the credibility of
tweets. Similarly, in (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011) a web service is presented that
automatically detects astroturfing (i.e., campaigns coming from disinterested,200
1http://www.tripadvisor.com
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grassroots participants that are in reality carried out by a single person or or-
ganisation) in Twitter. In a more recent work, Cheng et al. (Cheng et al., 2011)
analyse the structural properties of social networks to predict reciprocity of
communication among Twitter users. Similar to our approach, these proposals
illustrate the potential information that can be gleaned by automatic analysis205
of online social media interactions.
In a recent proposal, Charitonidis et al. (Charitonidis et al., 2015) analysed
online communications to study oﬄine group action processes. In particular,
this work analysed different Twitter conversations for a specific event to identify
weak signals that could be used to predict oﬄine group actions. These results210
evidence that there are such early indicators of group actions in online commu-
nication. Based on these findings, our paper proposes a novel model to predict
the salience of group identities in online conversations. In particular, our work
complements and extends this research by allowing the automated detection
and identification of group identities belonging to different domains and online215
media; as opposed to the work of Charitonidis et al. (Charitonidis et al., 2015)
which analyses Twitter conversations corresponding to a specific event and does
not propose a general predictive model.
3. Group Identity Model
In this section we present a formal description of the model used for analysing220
group identities. The aims of our model are twofold. Firstly, we aim to deter-
mine if we can automatically detect the existence of salient group identities in
text-based online communications. Such automatic detection of identity salience
would allow the detection of incipient and unforeseen group identities that might
lead to social action —as mentioned earlier, several works on social identity the-225
ory have noted the potential causal relationship between the salience of a social
identity and social action (Stryker & Burke, 2000; Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002).
Secondly, we aim to determine if we can automatically distinguish between dif-
ferent group identities in text-based online communications. This would enable
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automatic classification of interactions according to group identities of interest;230
e.g., group identities that may be considered as dangerous or beneficial.
3.1. Model Overview
In our model each user u corresponds to an individual. We denote by U the
set of users that communicate online. We also assume that there is a distin-
guished set I of group identities that correspond to social groups (e.g., supporter235
of Manchester United). Each user may belong to different social groups (i.e.,
s/he may have different group identities).
The information exchanged among users is formalised as tuples 〈s,R, c〉;
where s ∈ U is the sender, R ⊆ U is the set of receivers, and c is the message
content. In this paper we only consider text-based messages. Thus, the content240
of a message c consists of an ordered set of words {w1, ..., wn}, and a set of
terms {d1, ..., dk} containing metadata.
In each message, the sender user can invoke one or more group identities.
We define a function invoked that maps each message with the group identities
that are invoked in it; i.e., given a message 〈s,R, c〉, the identities invoked in it245
are defined as invoked(〈s,R, c〉) ⊆ I.
Group identities are culturally contingent and contextual and, therefore,
invoked in specific contexts or situations (Hankin, 2013). In online textual
communication, a message sent by one user is usually replied by other users and
the context or situation in which group identities are invoked is formed by related250
messages. In particular, we define a set of related messages (i.e., a message and
its replies) as a conversation. More formally, we define a conversation as a set
of ordered messages {m1, ...,mn} where each message mi is defined as a tuple
〈si, Ri, ci〉. In a conversation, the first message (m1) is a conversation initiation
message, i.e., the message that started the conversation; and the rest of the255
messages ({m2, ...,mn}) are replies to this message.
As aforementioned, one of the key factors that make it more likely that
a group identity is salient is the connectedness among persons who possess
this particular group identity. Thus, when a person interacts with others by
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invoking a group identity and the others confirm this identity, then the salience
of this identity is reinforced (Stryker & Burke, 2000). In fact, we hypothesise
that this is one of the main reasons for the formation of online communities,
to create situations in which group identities can be expressed and confirmed.
The salient group identities in a conversation are the group identities that are
invoked repeatedly across the messages in a conversation. More formally, we




where q ∈ N such that q < n and
{q}⋂
is the relaxed intersection of sets, which
corresponds to the classical intersection between sets except that it is allowed
to relax q sets in order to avoid an empty intersection. Thus, the salient group
identities is the set of all group identities that are invoked across all the messages260
(invoked(mi)), except q messages at most. Note that the relaxed intersection
makes it possible to make a robust identification of salient identities in a con-
versation with respect to some outlier messages that invoke identities that are
not predominant in the conversation.
When a conversation involves users who share the same group identity and265
are aware of it, it is highly probable that this group identity is invoked across
most of the messages2. In contrast, when a conversation involves users who do
not share a group identity or who are not aware of this fact, then it is highly
probable that the messages in the conversation invoke disparate identities and,
as a consequence, the salient group identity is the empty set. Accordingly, we270
define salience as a function that determines if a group identity is salient in a
conversation as follows:
2Note that it is also probable that a small proportion of the messages in a conversation
are sent by users who belong to an opposite group and want to confront the users sharing the




 True if salient({m1, ...,mn}) 6= ∅False otherwise
3.2. Features Analysed
We use linguistic and structural features of conversations to predict the
values of the salient and salience functions. In particular, we analyse five275
feature sets that can be extracted from online conversations. These feature sets
are further classified into three main categories: (i) online interaction patterns,
(ii) natural language features, and (iii) stylistic metrics.
Online Interaction Patterns. This category includes features that can be ex-
tracted by analysing structural metrics of an online conversation:280
Structural Feature Set. This set is formed by 3 numeric features: (i) the
number of messages contained in a conversation; (ii) the participation-
level of users, i.e., the ratio of users to the number of messages; and (iii)
the average influence of messages; defined as the average number of likes
or retweeted count of messages.285
Natural Language Features. This category includes features that can be ex-
tracted by applying natural language processing techniques to the text of the
messages contained in the conversations. Specifically, we make use of the tech-
niques proposed by Rayson in (Rayson, 2008) to extract natural language fea-
tures, since these techniques have been successfully used to analyse online con-290
versations extracted from Peer-2-Peer networks (Hughes et al., 2008) or Twitter
(Ferrario et al., 2012). These features are grouped into three feature sets:
POS Feature Set. This set is formed by numeric features that represent
the relative frequency of basic parts-of-speech (POS) in the messages con-
tained in conversations. Examples of such features include relative fre-295
quency of articles, adjectives, nouns, etc. To carry out the POS tagging,
we use the CLAWS (Garside, 1987) tagger, which considers a tagset with
138 POS tags.
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Semantic Feature Set. This set is formed by numeric features that rep-
resent the relative frequency of semantic tags in the messages contained300
in conversations. Examples of such semantic features include the relative
frequency of text classified as “geographical names” or text pertaining to
“groups and affiliations”, etc. To carry out the semantic tagging, we use
the USAS (Wilson & Rayson, 1993) system that considers a tagset with
452 semantic tags.305
Category Feature Set. This set is formed by numeric features that rep-
resent the relative frequency of 36 categories or key concepts that may
manifest in a conversation. These key categories are obtained by apply-
ing the keywords methodology (i.e., applying the keyness calculation to
word frequency lists) to extract key domain concepts (i.e., applying the310
keyness calculation to semantic tag frequency lists). Examples of such fea-
tures include relative frequency of categories such as sports, politics, etc.
To identify categories in conversations we make use of Rayson’s approach
(Rayson, 2008).
Stylistic Metrics. This category includes stylistic features that can be extracted315
by tools and methods from the field of authorship attribution (Stamatatos,
2009). Specifically, we use the stylistic metrics proposed in (Rashid et al., 2013),
which have been used detecting masquerading behaviour online:
Style Feature Set. This set is formed by 22 numeric features. Examples
include: the average length of messages in terms of words and characters,320
the frequency of emoticons, and the vocabulary richness.
Note that our feature sets only include features that can be analysed con-
sidering the information that is publicly available online. Other features such
as demographic information about the users interacting in conversations may
be private and cannot be exploited to predict group identities.325
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3.3. Classifiers Used
The features above are used to predict group identities in conversations.
Specifically, the analysis is aimed to detect salient group identities and to iden-
tify group identities. To this aim we have built two types of classifiers:
• Detection classifiers, which classify conversations into two categories: iden-330
tity salience, and no salience. A conversation (c) belongs to the category
identity salience when there is a group identity that is salient in the con-
versation (i.e., when salience(c) is True); and to the category no salience
otherwise.
• Identification classifiers, which classify conversations into a finite set of335
categories corresponding to the group identities that are salient in the
conversations. More formally, given a conversation (c) an identification
classifier tries to predict the value of the salient function for this conver-
sation (salient(c)).
We have implemented each type of classifier using two different algorithms:340
a J48 classifier and a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier, using the imple-
mentations in the Weka3 data-mining tool. These two classifiers have demon-
strated a good performance on classification tasks with textual data (Afroz
et al., 2012; Burgoon et al., 2003). To train these classifiers we annotate each
conversation in our dataset with its class and the values of the different features345
analysed. This leads to five training sets, one per feature set —in each training
set conversations are annotated with their class and the values of one feature
set.
3.4. Tool
We have implemented our model in a tool, Identi-scope, that makes these350
classifiers and the underlying feature extraction tools available as a workflow
3www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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to support studies of group identities and the potential that may come from
harnessing a deeper understanding of the processes that underpin such identities.
The tool enables users to study features underpinning identities of groups that
make their conversations available publicly. At the same time, users can point355
the tool to their private conversations to understand the various group identities
they inhabit online and the features that underpin those identities. The analysis
can be conducted over different time periods in the same conversation to study
fluctuations of social identities in response to particular stimuli, for instance,
when key features underpinning social identities are changed. However, we360
note that, due to ethical reasons, we have not introduced such stimuli into any
conversations in order to study such fluctuations. They can be a useful tool for
users or groups to study how their activities online may be influenced by actors
aiming to persuade or dissuade them from specific actions.
4. Evaluation365
4.1. Datasets used in evaluation
To evaluate our analysis model we collected text-based datasets from Face-
book and Twitter. According to our model, we refer to each post, comment or
tweet as a message. Thus, the content of the message is formed by textual con-
tent and the metadata contains information about the message influence (i.e.,370
the number of likes in case of posts and comments, and the retweet count in case
of tweets). Finally, the term conversation refers to a collection that includes: a
text-based message (i.e., a tweet or post) and other related text-based messages
(i.e., replies or comments).
4.1.1. Facebook Datasets375
All the information collected was publicly available on Facebook in two dif-
ferent periods: (i) between 18th February 2013 and 20th April 2013; and (ii)
between 12th May 2014 and 12th June 2014. For simplicity, we will refer to
these collection periods as first and second, respectively.
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Recent work on social psychology (Levine & Koschate, 2014) has demon-380
strated that the Internet provides users with online spaces for expressing their
social identities. Their study on Mumsnet4, a website for parents that hosts dis-
cussion forums focused on different topics (e.g., mums, feminism), demonstrates
that different forums represent different social identities (i.e., feminist forums
represent the feminist social identity) and that the individuals change their writ-385
ing style to adapt towards the group norm when a social identity is salient (e.g.,
when they post on the feminist forums). In accordance with these results, we
collected information from the Facebook pages of protest groups, sports teams
and personalities to obtain information about conversations in which group iden-
tities are salient5. Specifically, we collected conversations posted during our two390
collection periods from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Be-
yonce´, Lady Gaga and Manchester United. These pages are means to achieve
or maintain positive a public image and to build a social group around a given
protest group, sports team or personality. Supporters in turn use these pages to
express their affection and support and to communicate with other fans. Most395
of these messages invoke the group identity of being a supporter of a particular
person, sports team, or protest group. Besides that, users who belong to opposi-
tion groups can occasionally post messages in these pages to confront the salient
group identity. As highlighted by social identity theory (Reicher, 1996), these
opposition messages reinforce the salient group identity even further 6. Thus,400
we assume that the impact of outlier messages (i.e., messages invoking disparate
group identities) in these conversations is negligible and that all conversations
belong to the identity salient class. For example, we have collected posts and
comments from the Facebook page of Manchester United Football Club. This
4http://www.mumsnet.com
5Recall that social identities have been shown to relate to behaviour in these domains
(Jackson & Smith, 1999; Reicher, 1996; Platow et al., 1999).
6Social identities become more salient in situations where a social group conflicts with a













Beyonce´ First 43985350 424706







MTV First 43297624 521441
NBC News First 737559 76122
YouTube First 71981268 464301
Influence=Likes Count
Importance=Talking About Count
Table 1: Facebook Pages included in our study
page is used by someone on his behalf of Manchester United to post information405
about its activities. Besides, this page is used by thousands of users (mainly
Manchester United supporters) who comment on the posts. These users hold a
common identity (being a Manchester United supporter) and view themselves
as members of the same social group. For example, one of the messages in our
dataset posted by someone on behalf of Manchester United contains the follow-410
ing text “Rafael wins your Man of the Match vote for his fantastic display at
both ends vs. QPR. Well done Rafael!”. Among the messages sent in response
to this post we can find messages like “Oh! He deserves it”, “What goal Rafael
!!!”, and “Yeah,congrats to rafael. And hope best for you”.
To obtain information about conversations in which group identities are un-415
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likely to be salient, we focused on those situations in which a person interacts
with others on sites where heterogeneous information is published neutrally; i.e.,
in pages that do not try to create a social group around a protest movement,
personality or sports team. In particular, we obtained a dataset where iden-
tity salience is necessarily diluted by collecting a large number of conversations420
focused on varied topics and formed by messages with different tones. In such
conversations, the social structures supporting the salience of group identities
dissolve (Burke & Stets, 1999), which leads to users invoking disparate identi-
ties. For example, we have collected posts from news pages that aim to cover
all social, political and other events fairly and impartially. Users reading and425
commenting on these news pages may have several group identities but the fact
that they cannot warranty that a particular identity is shared by other users on
the news pages makes the level of commitment to a particular group identity
low and several group identities are likely to be invoked. Thus, we use these
conversations as samples belonging to the no salience class. Specifically, we col-430
lected all the posts and comments made during the first collection period from
the Facebook pages of BBC World News, MTV, NBC News and YouTube.
We collected information from these sources for three reasons. Firstly, they
are highly influential and important (see Table 1). We define influence as the
power to have an effect on other users. Accordingly, we define that a Facebook435
page is influential when many people like it. Thus, we consider the likes count
as an influence measure. We define importance as the actual manifestation of
effect on other users. Accordingly, we define that a Facebook page is important
when many people mention it. Thus, we consider the talking about count as
an importance measure. Secondly, these sources are frequently updated and440
commented on and, as a consequence, they contain a lot of information (see
Tables 2 and 3). Finally, they cover different types of content, such as sports,
politics, news, and so on.
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Page C M U W
Anonymous 6 1650 1410 45086
Barack Obama 142 94010 67419 4628148
Beyonce´ 10 2946 2510 172923
BBC World News 612 52841 46044 1589676
Lady Gaga 4 1640 1304 21724
Manchester United 246 88434 77600 1547141
MTV 152 20765 19601 382797
NBC News 271 55616 44016 1314677
YouTube 33 1983 1938 24021
C=conversations, M=messages, U=Users, W=words
Table 2: Facebook dataset (First collection period)
Page C M U W
Anonymous 4 452 410 11633
Barack Obama 7 3710 2902 143901
Lady Gaga 5 998 987 18260
Manchester United 39 8695 8446 190219
C=conversations, M=messages, U=Users, W=words




Justin Bieber 36299641 548920
Barack Obama 28587127 189859
Lady Gaga 35229893 243017




Table 4: Profiles included in our study
4.1.2. Twitter Datasets
Twitter API Dataset. This dataset contains tweets publicly available on Twitter445
between 18 February 2013 and 20 April 2013 that have been collected using the
Twitter public API.
Similar to our approach to the Facebook dataset, to obtain information about
conversations in which a group identity is salient, we collected all the conver-
sations from the Twitter profiles of Anonymous, Justin Bieber, Barack Obama,450
Lady Gaga and Manchester United. To obtain information about conversations
in which group identities are unlikely to be salient, we collected tweets and
replies from the Twitter profile of MTV.
We collected information from these sources because (see Tables 4 and 5):
they are highly influential, important, contain lots of information and cover455
different types of content. We define that a Twitter profile is influential when
many people follow it —i.e., followers count. Similarly, we define that a Twitter
profile is important when many people list it —i.e., listed count (a list is a
curated group of users).
2011 England Riots Dataset. This dataset contains the tweets exchanged during460
the 2011 England Riots. The riots are also called “BlackBerry riots” because
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Profile C M U W
Anonymous 201 824 714 12598
Barack Obama 219 2379 1529 41945
Justin Bieber 295 3289 2700 35870
Lady Gaga 5 64 47 894
Manchester United 730 1875 1814 30242
MTV 642 2122 1925 30481
C=conversations, M=messages, U=Users, W=words
Table 5: Twitter API dataset
Set C M U W
TottenhamPreRiots 29 3467 3151 60875
TottenhamRiots 29 4244 4203 63189
LondonRiots 29 4706 4699 73175
C=conversations, M=messages, U=Users, W=words
Table 6: Twitter England Riots dataset
people used mobile devices and social media to organise them (Halliday). Thus,
this dataset contains real tweets exchanged during group identity formation
processes, group identity invocation and social action coordination. Specifically,
the disturbances reflected in our dataset began on Saturday 6 August 2011, after465
a protest in Tottenham following the death of Mark Duggan, a local who was
shot dead by police on Thursday 4 August 2011. In the following days the
riots spread across other parts of London and other cities in England including
Birmingham, Bristol, and Manchester.
To collect this dataset, we have used Topsy7, which is a search engine for470
social posts and socially shared content, primarily on Twitter. The results pro-
vided by this search engine are not organised following a conversation pattern
7http://topsy.com/
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(i.e., an initiating tweet and its replies). Thus, we approximated the conversa-
tions by grouping the tweets according to the time when they were exchanged
(e.g., consecutive tweets belong to the same conversation). Specifically, we have475
selected a subset of the tweets corresponding to the riots in Tottenham and
London as follows:
1. TottenhamPreRiots. This set contains tweets that match the query #tottenham
OR tottenham and were exchanged on 4 Aug. 2011. At that point in time,
the riots had not started in Tottenham and we assume that tweets invoke480
disparate identities and that conversations belong to the no salience class.
In fact, during this period of time, the number of tweets matching this
query per hour was lower than 500. Among these tweets we can find mes-
sages like: “has delighted the board of Tottenham Hotspur by winning
the Premier Division” and “So we just got to tottenham hale & realised485
we left our money at home. Doh! Back we go”.
2. TottenhamRiots. This set contains tweets that match the query #tottenham
OR tottenham and were sent on the 6 Aug. 2011. At that point in time,
riots were very prominent in Tottenham and, as mentioned above, Twitter
and other social networks were used to coordinate social action. Indeed,490
during this period of time the number of tweets matching this query per
hour was higher than 14000. Thus, we assume that group identities are
salient in these conversations. Among these tweets we can find messages
like: “It’s not just #tottenham. #MetPolice = corrupt dishonest + unac-
countable ie rotten to the core” and “I’m proud of tottenham right now”.495
3. LondonRiots. This set contains tweets that match the query #londonriots
OR (#london AND riots) and were sent on 8 Aug. 2011. At this point,
the riots were very prominent in London and the number of tweets match-
ing this query per hour was >60000 (compared to <2500 on the previous
day). Thus, we assume that group identities are salient in these con-500
versations. Among these tweets we can find messages like: “A riot is the
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language of the unheard - Martin Luther King. #londonriots” and “What
army do we have to bring in - the majority of them are being used as target
practice by the Taliban...!!! #londonriots”.
Note the queries used for selecting the different datasets have been previously505
used to identify weak signals of real-world mobilisations in (Charitonidis et al.,
2015).
Table 6 shows the number of conversations, messages, users and words con-
tained in the riots sets.
4.2. Detecting Salience of group identities510
4.2.1. Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is it possible
to automatically detect the presence of salient group identities online?
Our first research question is related to the detection of the existence of
salient group identities in online conversations. To answer this question, we
used the conversations extracted during the first collection period from the515
pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, and Manchester United as examples of
conversations where there are salient group identities. We used the conversa-
tions collected during the first collection period from the pages of BBC World
News, NBC News and YouTube, as examples of conversations where there is
no apparent salient identity shared by the users. We trained the J48 and SVM520
detection classifiers with the conversations annotated with each feature set. To
assess the accuracy of these classifiers we used leave-one-out cross-validation
—using a single conversation from the set as the validation data, and the re-
maining conversations as the training data; this was repeated such that each
conversation in the dataset was used once as the validation data.525
Table 7 shows the results obtained by each classifier when the structural fea-
tures, POS features, semantic features, category features and style features are
considered. Specifically, this table shows the accuracy, which is the percentage
of correctly classified conversations; and the weighted (by class size) area under
the ROC curve. Accuracy provides an understandable measure for classifier530
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Table 7: Identity salience detection when different feature sets are used to train the classifiers
performance. However, accuracy must be interpreted with caution when classes
in the dataset are unbalanced (as occurs in our experiments). In this situation,
the area under the ROC curve is a more robust performance measure (Metz,
1978). According to guidelines for the interpretation of the area under the ROC
curve, excellent classifiers obtain areas under the ROC curve within the in-535
terval (0.9, 1], good classifiers (0.8, 0.9], fair classifiers (0.7, 0.8], poor classifiers
(0.6, 0.7], and fail classifiers obtain areas lower or equal to 0.6.
From the results in Table 7, we can determine that it is possible to detect the
presence of salient group identities in online conversations with a high degree
of accuracy —an accuracy of 98.94% is obtained with the J48 classifier and540
the structural feature set. Figure 1 shows the ROC curves obtained by this
classifier8. However, all the feature sets, with the exception of style features,
allow the detection of identity salience with a high degree of accuracy, i.e., there
is at least one classifier with an accuracy greater than 96% and the area under
8To dismiss overfitting problems we also repeated this experiment using cross-validation,
which is a well-known technique to avoid overfitting, with different numbers of folders and we
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Figure 1: ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the J48
classifier and the structural feature set.
the ROC curve greater than 0.9.545
We observe that the style feature set is less discriminative, e.g., the area un-
der the ROC curve obtained by the best classifier trained with the style feature
set is the lowest among all classifiers. This can be explained by the fact that
the style features provide a characterisation of the style of the different persons
but are not general enough to detect the common features that characterise the550
existence of salient group identities.
4.2.2. Are these results generalizable to detection of identity salience for un-
known group identities and on different online social media?
Facebook Generalization. In this experiment we aim to determine whether the
previous results are generalizable to detect salience of unknown group identi-555
ties. To this aim, we tested the classifiers with a different dataset extracted
from Facebook. Specifically, we used the conversations collected during the
first collection period from the Facebook pages of Beyonce´ and Lady Gaga as
examples of conversations where there are salient group identities. We used
the conversations collected during the first collection period from the Facebook560
page of MTV as examples of conversations where there is no apparent salient
group identity. Thus, we are evaluating if the classifiers are able to detect the
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Table 8: Identity salience detection: Facebook generalization
salience of group identities that belong to different domains (i.e., the training
set contains conversations about politics, sports, news, videos, whereas the test
set contains conversations about music and TV).565
Table 8 shows the results obtained. In general the accuracies of all classifiers
are lower than in the previous experiment. Therefore, in order to determine
which specific features are most suitable for detecting identity salience, we anal-
ysed the information gain (Kent, 1983) of features. The Information gain (IG)
is frequently used in machine learning to define a preferred sequence of features570
to be used by a decision tree (such as the J48 classifier). Usually a feature with
high IG should be preferred to other features. We calculated the IG of each
feature for detecting identity salience and trained our J48 and SVM classifiers
with the top 250 features by IG. This represents less than 40% of all 651 features
arising from the union of all our feature sets. We used the same training data575
set as in Section 4.2.1 and tested the classifiers for detecting identity salience or
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Figure 2: ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem when conversations
from other Facebook pages are used to test the SVM classifier trained with the most relevant
feature set.
As can be seen in Table 8, the classifier trained with the most relevant
features performs very well in this generalization in terms of accuracy and the
area under the ROC curve. Specifically, it outperforms all classifiers trained with580
one feature set (i.e., an area under the ROC curve of 0.94 is obtained with the
SVM classifier). Figure 2 shows the ROC curves obtained by this classifier. This
indicates that a combination of the high IG features from the various feature sets
allows the most generalizable classifier to be trained. Therefore, we can conclude
that, by using a combination of features, it is possible to automatically detect585
the salience of unknown group identities within the same online media (as used
for training the classifiers) with a high degree of accuracy.
Twitter Generalization. In this experiment we analyse if our analysis model is
generalizable to detect identity salience on a different online media. We used the
conversations contained in the TottenhamRiots set, in the Barack Obama and590
in the Justin Bieber profiles as examples of conversations where there are salient
group identities; and conversations in the TottenhamPreRiots set and the MTV
profile, as examples of conversations where there is not a salient group identity.
Again, we employed leave-one-out cross-validation.
Table 9 shows the results obtained by the detection classifiers in this experi-595
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Table 9: Identity salience detection: Twitter generalization
ment. If we compare these results against the results of the Facebook detection
experiment (described in Section 4.2.1), we observe that the performance of all
classifiers deteriorates slightly in this experiment. This may be due to the fact
that the tweet size is limited to 140 characters and fewer words are used to
analyse conversations and train classifiers. As a consequence, the J48 classifier600
trained with the structural feature set (features not affected by the number of
words in conversations) outperforms the rest of classifiers. Specifically, the J48
classifier trained with the structural feature set obtains an accuracy of 94.73%
and an area under the ROC curve of 0.96 — see Figure 3 for the ROC curves ob-
tained this classifier. This demonstrates that our analysis model is generalizable605
to detect identity salience on different online media with a high accuracy. We
can also observe from the table that both the J48 and SVM classifiers trained
with the 250 most relevant features have a high accuracy —90% or above with
a high ROC area (≥ 0.9).
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Figure 3: ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the J48
classifier and the structural feature set.
style feature set is the less discriminative, i.e., the best classifier trained with
the style feature is just a fair classifier since the area under the ROC curve is
lower than 0.8. This supports our hypothesis that style features are not general
enough to detect the common features of salient group identities.
4.2.3. Which features are most suitable for detecting identity salience?615
Of the 250 most relevant features for detecting identity salience, 3 are struc-
tural, 110 POS, 104 semantic, 30 categories and 3 style. However, when we
inspect these features in more detail we note that the IG of most individual fea-
tures is not so substantially high to indicate that those features individually are
strong indicators of identity salience. But our generalization experiments show620
that collectively they provide a strong basis for predicting identity salience.
Table 10 shows the 10 most relevant features for detecting identity salience.
Specifically, for each relevant feature, it presents its type, description and IG
value. We can observe that the IG values are low, which means that, in general,
the features are less discriminative. Six of the ten most relevant features are625
semantic tags, two of them are structural features while one each is from the
POS and style sets. This information is in line with the results achieved by the





Structural Av. Influence 0.68
Structural Messages 0.48
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0.37
Semantic Measurement 0.36
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0.35
Semantic Money generally 0.34
POS Base form of lexical verb (e.g., give) 0.34
Semantic Degree (i.e., intensifier terms) 0.34
Semantic Quantities 0.33
Style Av. Typing 0.32
Table 10: Ten most relevant features for detecting identity salience
in Section 4.2.1 are trained with the structural, POS and semantic feature sets).
Specifically, the average IG of structural features is noticeably higher than the630
average IG of any other feature set. This explains the fact that the best classifier
trained with the semantic feature set, which contains 6 of the 10 most relevant
features, does not lead to better performance when compared with the best
classifier trained with the structural feature set.
We can also observe that the two most relevant features are the structural635
features. This is explained by the fact that structural features allow to detect
interaction patterns that characterise all group identities. For instance, it is
possible that users who share a group identity are more prone to like comments
that invoke this identity. However, detecting identity salience using structural
features only may lead to poor results when detecting incipient group identi-640
ties; such incipient group identities may have little influence. Furthermore, the
structural feature of “average influence” has a high IG which reflects identity
theorists’ view of a cause-effect relationship, whereby the salience of a social
identity influences collective action.
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4.3. Distinguishing between group identities645
4.3.1. Is it possible to distinguish between different group identities?
Having determined that it is possible to detect the salience or lack thereof
group identities in online conversations, we focus on the question of whether it is
possible to distinguish between different group identities. Thus, in this case the
class of each conversation is its group identity (i.e., Facebook page from which650
each conversation has been extracted). To answer our research question we used
the conversations collected during the first collection period from the Facebook
pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga and Manchester United to
train identification classifiers.
From the results in Table 11, we can determine that it is possible to distin-655
guish between group identities with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of
99.68% is obtained with the SVM classifier and the semantic feature set. Figure
4 shows the ROC curves obtained by this classifier9. However, all feature sets
allow group identities to be predicted with a high confidence (i.e., for all feature
sets there is at least one classifier that obtains an area under the ROC curve660
greater than 0.9). We next analyse if these results are generalizable.
4.3.2. Are these results generalizable to distinguishing group identities over time
and on different online social media?
Time Generalization. We analyse whether the results in Section 4.3.1 can be
generalized to distinguishing between group identities over time. It is obvious665
that classifiers can only classify instances into those classes that belong to the
training set. This entails that we cannot use the classifiers to predict other
group identities not included in the training set. Because of this, we can only
determine if the results obtained in the above analysis, can be generalized to
conversations invoking the same group identities over a different period of time.670
Note that the groups may evolve over time; e.g., the issues that are of interest
9Again, to dismiss overfitting problems we also repeated this experiment using cross-
validation and we obtained very similar results.
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Figure 4: ROC curves obtained for the identity identification problem with the SVM classifier
trained with the semantic feature set.
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Figure 5: ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem when conversations from a
different time period are used to test the SVM classifier trained with the most relevant feature
set.
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to a group may change throughout time, but the collective sense of belonging
to a specific group (i.e., the group identity) remains.
We test the accuracy of our previously trained classifiers, trained with the
conversations collected during the first collection period from the Facebook675
pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga and Manchester United to
distinguish between group identities in the conversations collected during the
second collection period from the same pages. Thus, we are evaluating if the
classifiers are able to predict the same group identities (i.e., being a supporter
or opponent of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga or Manchester United)680
when they are invoked more than one year later. Similar to identity salience
detection, we also determine the IG of all the features in the union of our feature
sets and use the top 250 features to train J48 and SVM identification classifiers.
As we can observe from Table 12, the accuracy and the area under the ROC
curve for all classifiers based on individual feature sets decrease. This is ex-685
plained by the fact that these groups have evolved in terms of content (e.g.,
the main topics discussed in conversations), style (e.g., the number of words
per message) and structure (e.g., number of users per conversation). For exam-
ple, the influence and importance of Barack Obama’s Facebook page increased
noticeably between the two collection periods (see Table 1). As a result, it is690
possible that the number of users interacting in the page, the number of likes
received per each message and the activity of these users changed drastically.
These differences make it more challenging to predict group identities over time.
Despite these changes, we can observe that group identities can be identified
with a high accuracy by the classifier trained with the POS feature set —an695
accuracy of 83.64% and an area under the ROC curve of 0.86 is obtained with
the SVM classifier and the POS feature set. This entails that despite the passing
of time, there are syntactic characteristics of each group identity that remain
unaltered. We also observe that the classifiers trained with the 250 most relevant
features perform better than those classifiers trained with individual feature sets700
(except the POS feature set). This shows that it is possible to use a combination
of features to automatically predict and distinguish group identities over time
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with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of 82.92% is obtained with the
SVM classifier and the most relevant feature set with substantial confidence in
the prediction (i.e., the ROC area is 0.82). Figure 5 shows the ROC curves705
obtained by the SVM classifier and the 250 most relevant features.
Twitter Generalization. We evaluate the extent to which our analysis can be
generalized to identify group identities on different online media. To this end,
we trained identification classifiers with the conversations contained in the Tot-
tenhamRiots and LondonRiots sets and the Twitter profiles of Barack Obama,710
Lady Gaga, Manchester United and Anonymous. Again, we employed leave-
one-out cross-validation to assess each classifier and feature set.
Table 13 shows the results obtained. If we compare these results against the
results of the Facebook identification experiment (described in Section 4.3.1),
we observe that the performance of all classifiers deteriorates slightly in this715
experiment. Again, this may be explained by the tweet size limitation. Besides
that, we have used conversations invoking similar group identities (i.e., group
identities that correspond to different protest groups), which may be more diffi-
cult to distinguish from one another. Despite these similarities, group identities
can be identified with high precision (i.e., there are classifiers that obtain areas720
under the ROC curve greater than 0.8). We observe that the classifiers trained
with the 250 most relevant features perform better overall than those trained
with individual feature sets. This shows that that our analysis model is gener-
alizable to identify group identities on different online media with a high degree
of accuracy – an accuracy of 87.62% is obtained with the SVM classifier and725
the most relevant feature set with substantial confidence in the predictions (i.e.,
the ROC area is 0.89). Figure 6 shows the ROC curves obtained by the SVM
classifier and the 250 most relevant features.
The classifiers trained with the style features obtain the lowest accuracies and
ROC areas. This result confirms that style features provide a characterisation730
of the individual styles and are not general enough to distinguish the common
features that characterise each group identity.
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Figure 6: ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem with the SVM classifier





POS Singular letter of the alphabet (e.g., a) 0.96
POS Formula 0.92
Style Av. Message Length (Chars) 0.92
Semantic Power relationship 0.91
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0.9
Category Sports 0.89
Style Av. Message Length (Words) 0.88
Semantic Measurement 0.87
Category Crime 0.87
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0.86
Table 14: Ten most relevant features for distinguishing group identities
4.3.3. Which features enable a specific group identity to be accurately predicted?
Of the 250 features used to train the classifiers in Tables 12 and 13, 101 are
semantic features, 106 POS, 35 categories, 5 style and 3 are structural features.735
This may lead one to conclude that semantic and POS features are the most
necessary to characterise a group identity. However, when we study the IG of
the top 10 features for predicting group identities (see Table 14), we observe
that this is not necessarily the case. As illustrated by this table, 4 of the 10
most relevant features are semantic tags, 2 are style metrics, 2 are categories740
and 2 are POS tags; and all have very high IGs.
Interestingly, two style features show high IG, yet the best classifier trained
with the style feature set is less accurate when compared with the best classifiers
trained with the other feature sets. This is explained by the fact that the two
high IG style features provide the same information (i.e., the more words in a745




Our results validate our hypothesis that group identities affect the way in
which people communicate online and that it is possible to define a model that750
automatically analyses group identities using features extracted from text-based
online communications. We now discuss some of the key insights and their
potential implications.
Group identity manifests in semantic features. When distinguishing between
group identities in Facebook (cf. Table 14), it is not surprising to note the755
presence of categories such as Crime and Sports —these are evocative topics
and have been shown to have a causal connection with social identity forma-
tion (Levine & Crowther, 2008). The more interesting data is the presence
of semantic features: General and Abstract Terms, which pertain to language
use with regards to action/inaction in general, and Social Actions, States and760
Processes, which cover language use involving reciprocity, participation, friend-
liness and approachability. Interestingly these features also appear in the ten
most relevant features for identity salience detection in Table 10 (albeit with a
significantly lower IG). This reflects that formative processes for social identity
manifest themselves in the semantics of the group conversations and can act as765
potential indicators for the emergence of social identities in online groups.
We also note the presence of the Power Relationship semantic feature in
Table 14. This feature covers terms depicting power/authority/influence and
organisation/administration. Also noteworthy are: the structural indicator of
average influence and semantic indicator of intensifier terms (depicted by the770
Degree semantic tag) for identity salience in Table 10. Together, these point to a
potential link between such features and social identity and group mobilisation.
All these features merit further investigation.
Impact of the type and nature of social media. Our attempts at generalizing
our analysis show reasonably high degrees of accuracy. However, they also775
indicate that the very nature of the social network and that of the data it
carries has an effect. In particular, our generalization experiments show that
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there is not a single feature set that is able to produce satisfactory results in
Facebook and Twitter. This may be attributed to the limits on message size in
Twitter or how identity is implicitly expressed on different social media owing780
to the different features they afford to users (Conover et al., 2011; Zhao et al.,
2008) and how these features may lead to various “in-group” and “out-group”
formulations. However, the 250 most relevant features have been able to predict
group identities with high accuracies across different social media. It would be
interesting to study how other types of social media impact the accuracy of such785
a predictive approach and whether a hybrid feature set drawing upon training
data from a range of online social media can provide a basis for accurately
detecting incipient group identities.
The ethics of it all. The possibility of automatically predicting group identities
poses a broad range of challenging ethical questions. For example, the features790
analysed in our study may be used for monitoring the evolution of group iden-
tities over time. This may permit the identification of different steps involved
in the consolidation of social identities online. In turn, it may be possible to
identify actions (e.g., shifts in behaviour) that reliably impact on a group’s
subsequent behaviour. By “seeding” specific semantic or structural features in795
text-based communications it may be possible to make specific identities salient
and hence “nudge” the group’s behaviour towards a specific outcome. On the
one hand, democratic movements such as the Arab Spring could be promoted;
e.g., by creating messages with an strong emphasis on reciprocity, participation,
friendliness and approachability10. On the other hand, however, so could be vi-800
olent actions such as the England Riots. These questions are highly pertinent
given recent high profile news of mass surveillance activities such as Prism and
the Snowden leaks.
We have implemented the Identi-scope tool that can enable exploration of
these challenges. Furthermore, groups can utilise the tool to study if their con-805
10According to our experiments, these topics are key features underpinning group identities.
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versations are being systematically nudged towards particular action or inaction
through manipulation of the features we have identified.
Limitations of our analysis. Our evaluation and results are based on data col-
lected from Facebook and Twitter. As we note above, the nature of the social
network and the purpose for which it is used by the various parties involved can810
influence the way social identities manifest themselves. Data from other social
networks, especially those that cater for specific demographics, e.g., young peo-
ple, or particular group affiliations (political, religious, etc.) may yield different
results. One may conjecture that social networks that are aimed at particular
group affiliations are likely to yield more accurate prediction of group iden-815
tities. At the same time, there may be more fine-grained social identities at
play (compared to the coarse-grained group identities in our study) in these
social networks. Further experimentation is needed to determine whether the
automated analysis presented in this paper will yield high accuracies for such
fine-grained social identities.820
Our model predicts those group identities that are sustained by online in-
teractions. Notwithstanding the role of oﬄine interactions in social identity
formation and processes, our model only considers the information that is pub-
licly available in online social media to predict group identities. The creation of
a hybrid model capable of considering both online and oﬄine interactions when825
predicting social identities is left as future work.
Model Feasibility. The proposed analytical model and the Identi-scope tool make
extensive usage of different APIs provided by third parties. In particular, both
the Facebook Graph API11 and the Twitter public API12 are used to collect the
conversations to be used by the analytical model. Note these two APIs impose830
rate call limits to non-paying users. Similarly, our model and tool also make





is also accessed via its API over the Internet. Thus, the time need to analyse
messages may be affected by network latency, congestion etc. However, these
APIs process a reasonable amount of requests in a short period of time (e.g., the835
Facebook API allows us to collect information about 1000 messages in less than
6 seconds). Finally, we would like to mention that, for those domains where
the volume and speed at which data is produced makes it necessary to reduce
the time needed for processing, solutions such as parallelisation of the analysis,
usage of paid APIs, etc. can be applied.840
Model Vulnerabilities. Our experiments demonstrate that our model is robust to
predict group identities even if there are messages that invoke outlier identities
(i.e., we have not performed any preprocessing on conversations to filter out
outlier messages). However, this robustness may not hold when evasion tech-
niques are used to mask group identities. For example, Islamic State supporters845
could try to misdirect group identity detection by injecting into their conver-
sations messages in which a fake identity is invoked. Even more, automated
approaches could be envisioned so that a single entity (whether individual or
organisation) controls a large number of fake accounts to launch such evasive
attacks. However, these threats can be mitigated using existing sybil defences850
(Fong, 2011; Alvisi et al., 2013), classification techniques (Thomas et al., 2013),
and stylometry techniques (Ding et al., 2015; Brennan et al., 2012; Afroz et al.,
2014) to discard fake accounts and messages. The specific mitigation techniques
to be applied in a given situation may depend not only on the evasion techniques
used by attackers but also on the nature of the social media14.855
6. Conclusion
The model and results presented in this paper provide a stepping stone
towards understanding how group identities and their salience manifest in text-
based communications via online social media and the implications this holds
14An study to generate specific mitigation strategies is beyond the scope of this paper.
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regarding risk posed by external agents (government or otherwise) to influence860
collective action/inaction mediated by online social media. Our results show
that it is possible to use linguistic and structural features and machine learning
techniques to automatically distinguish between specific group identities as well
as detect when group identities may be salient. Such predictions are not just
highly accurate within a particular social networking platform but also show865
potential for generalization on different types of social networks. Particularly
insightful are our observations about specific semantic features of the language
used in conversations that indicate social processes for group formulation at
work. Our analysis also shows a potential link between group identities and
mobilisation inherent in the language of online groups. We also highlight the870
challenging ethical questions raised by the ability to detect and, potentially
affect, social identities and their salience through analysis and manipulation of
language features. We have developed a tool that allows exploration of social
identities by individuals and groups so that they may develop resilience against
outside agents attempting to influence their actions through manipulation of875
the features we have identified.
Our future work will focus on exploring specific research questions around
the manifestation of particular types of semantic features and the impact of the
nature of the social network as well as communication modes and processes on
group identity analysis. Only by gaining a deeper understanding of the features880
and communication processes at play can we hope to unravel the various ethics
and privacy questions raised by this paper.
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